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Jury Trials For Juveniles:
Rhetoric and Reality
In 1215 the framers of the Magna Carta rejected the power of the King to
control a freeman's liberty in the absence of a trial by jury of his peers.'
Today, almost eight centuries later, California juveniles are denied this
same basic right to a jury trial. The fate of youths who have allegedly
committed criminal acts and face confinement of indeterminate duration is
in the hands of a single judge or juvenile court referee.
The denial of this right to a jury trial because of the offender's age is only
a recent innovation. Under English common law, a child accused of a crime
was presumed capable of forming the requisite criminal intent and was
subject to the same sanctions and procedural safeguards as adult criminals.2
This practice was carried over to the United States where, until the turn of
the century, juveniles enjoyed the same constitutional protections as their
elders.
The significant change came in 1899 when social reformers and womens'
organizations lobbied and agitated the first Juvenile Court Act into exist-
ence.3 The Illinois Juvenile Court System was based on the parens patriae
concept; 4 the state, as surrogate parent, would do what was necessary to
help the child, and, if a criminal act were alleged, the function of the court
was to rehabilitate rather than to punish the offender.5 The normal procedur-
al protections were deemed superfluous; 6 indeed they would interfere with
the proper functioning of the juvenile court, which required an informal,
non-adversary atmosphere in order to be effective. 7
The great enthusiasm which heralded the birth of the juvenile court
1. But see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 (1968), which notes that some
historians disagree with the theory that the Magna Carta was the origin of the jury trial.
2. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1967); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104,
106 (1909) [hereinafter cited as Mack].
3. E. LEMMERT, SOCIAL ACTION AND LEGAL CHANGE, 37 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
LEMMERT]; Simpson, Rehabilitation as the Justification of a Separate Juvenile Justice System,
64 CALIF. L. REV. 984, 984 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Simpson].
4. Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and
Form, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 7, 9-10 [hereinafter cited as Handler).
5. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967).
6. Simpson, supra note 3, at 987.
7. Mack, supra note 2, at 120; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME
28 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
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system in Illinois 8 spread rapidly. California enacted its first Juvenile Court
Act in 1903. 9 However, the juvenile court system was not subjected to
critical judicial scrutiny until relatively recently. 0 Not a single case involv-
ing the juvenile court system reached the United States Supreme Court
during the 65 years that followed the Illinois Act. From the opinion in the
first case, Kent v. United States,"I it is clear that concern about the injustices
resulting from the lack of procedural safeguards had grown in the interim. In
Kent, the Court found it to be a denial of due process to transfer a juvenile to
the adult court system without a hearing and the effective assistance of
counsel. I2 The Court turned a critical eye to the dreams of the rehabilitators.
It was becoming clear that the system's theoretical justification, lessened
recidivism, was a goal which was perhaps not being attained, 13 and that the
price exacted in terms of procedural rights denied to juveniles was too dear.
In re Gault14 followed one year later. The due process, or fundamental
fairness, standard announced in Kent was held to require that juveniles must
be notified of the charges against them, that they must have a right to
counsel, a right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against them, and a
privilege against self-incrimination.' 5 As justification for the procedural
reforms, the Gault Court emphasized the failure of juvenile courts to
rehabilitate,' 6 and challenged the intellectual basis of the parens patriae
concept as presenting "historic credentials . . . of dubious relevance."17
The pendulum swing towards increased procedural protections continued
in In re Winship, 18 when the Court required the standard of proof in a
juvenile case beyond a reasonable doubt instead of a preponderance of the
evidence.' 9 But the swinging stopped. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania20 held that
a jury trial was not mandated by the due process/fundamental fairness
standard. 2' The McKeiver Court made it clear, however, that states were
free to use juries if they chose 22 and encouraged them to experiment
further. 23
8. LEMMERT, supra note 3, at 27-28.
9. CAL. STATS. 1903, c. 43, §20, at 44.
10. This was due partly to the dearth of appeals from juvenile court adjudications. Some
states did not allow appeals. California did, but between 1906 and 1960 a total of only about 115
appeals were pursued. See LEMMERT, supra note 3, at 78; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 7, at
4.
11. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
12. Id. at 554.
13. As reported in the REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT
or COLUMBIA 773 (1966), 61 percent of the juveniles referred to the Juvenile Court in the
District of Columbia, in 1965 had previously been referred at least once.
14. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
15. See id. at 26-57.
16. Id. at 22.
17. Id. at 16.
18. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
19. Id. at 364.
20. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
21. Id. at 545.
22. Id. at 553.
23. Id. at 547.
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This comment echoes that encouragement. The California Supreme Court
has not considered a juvenile's claim to jury entitlement since 1924. In In re
Daedler,24 the court considered the case of a minor charged with murder
and held that the California Constitution did not require a jury trial since the
processes of the juvenile court were not penal in character. 25 Because the
juvenile court law has changed so drastically since that time, the continued
validity of that holding is questionable. 26 Additionally, society has changed
in the last fifty years, and constitutional analysis has evolved as well. 27 The
denial of a jury trial right to California juveniles accused of a crime has
never been subjected to the strict scrutiny test called for under modern equal
protection analysis.2 8 That analysis is the function of this comment.
It will first be established that the right to a jury trial is a fundamental
right, and, thus, the strict scrutiny test applies. The argument that juveniles
are not entitled to claim that right because the juvenile court proceedings are
not penal will then be discussed. Following this, the state's interests served
by the denial of a jury trial: confidentiality; informality; and judicial
economy will be examined to determine whether any of those interests may
be termed compelling, and if so, whether alternative means of advancing
them are available. The benefits that may reasonably be expected to flow
from the jury trial will then be discussed. The juvenile court system con-
tinues to evolve, and it is hoped that this comment will aid the architects of
that system in guiding its evolution.
THE NATURE OF THE JURY TRIAL RIGHT-IS IT FUNDAMENTAL?
Equal protection principles were utilized by the California Supreme Court
in People v. Olivas2 9 in requiring that youthful nisdemeanants not be
deprived of personal liberty for periods longer than their adult counter-
parts. 30 In Olivas, the court, after remarking on its independent power to
find a higher standard required by the California Constitution than would be
required under the federal constitution, 31 declared personal liberty to be a
fundamental interest. 32 It is urged that the California Court should utilize
that same equal protection approach with respect to juvenile jury trials.
24. 194 Cal. 320, 228 P. 467 (1924).
25. Id. at 332, 228 P. at 472.
26. See CAL. STATS. 1915, c. 631, §1, at 1225 for the prior law which lumped juveniles
accused of committing a crime with orphans, vagrants, incorrigibles, truants, and habitual pool
players. Thus, in Daedler, 194 Cal. at 325,228 P. at 469, the court relied heavily on Exparte Ah
Peen, 51 Cal. 280 (1876), a case dealing with a child who came before the juvenile court because
his parents were unknown. Current juvenile court law distinguishes minors charged with
criminal violations from others who may be declared wards of the court. CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §§600-602. This comment is concerned only with the right to a jury trial of minors accused
of a crime.
27. Katz, Juveniles Committed to Penal Institutions-Do They Have a Right to a Jury
Trial? 13 J. FAm. L. 675, 688 (1973-74).
28. Simpson, supra note 3, at 995 n. 66.
29. 17 Cal. 3d 236, 551 P.2d 375, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1976).
30. Id. at 257, 551 P.2d at 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
31. Id. at 246, 551 P.2d at 381, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
32. Id. at 251, 551 P.2d at 384, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
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The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 7 of the California Constitution forbid the denial of equal protection
of the laws to any person. These provisions have been interpreted to require
that a state show a rational basis for the legislative classifications it seeks to
make.33 A stricter scrutiny is applied, however, if a statute affects a funda-
mental interest or employs a suspect classification.34 When a classification
is subjected to strict scrutiny, the state must demonstrate that it has a
compelling interest that is being advanced, and that there are no less
constitutionally burdensome alternatives available. 35
There are three sources that guarantee a jury trial. The sixth amendment
of the United States Constitution guarantees an accused a jury trial in all
criminal prosecutions.3 6 Article I, Section 16 of the California Constitution
secures the jury right "to all,' 37 and the California Legislature has provided
for a jury trial in almost all cases of civil commitment. 38 In adult cases,
courts describing the rights derived from each of these sources have charac-
terized the jury trial right as a fundamental interest.
First, in Duncan v. Louisiana39 the United States Supreme Court made
the sixth amendment jury trial guarantee applicable to the States through the
fourteenth amendment. n0 The Duncan Court stated: "the right to a jury trial
in serious criminal cases is a fundamental right and hence must be recog-
nized by the States as part of their obligation to extend due process of law to
all persons within their jurisdiction." 41
Second, the right to a jury trial under the California Constitution was
termed fundamental in People v. Superior Court.42 In sustaining an order of
mistrial where one juror had equivocated when asked whether he consented
fully and voluntarily to the verdict, 43 the California Supreme Court de-
clared: "The [California] Constitution guarantees the fundamental right to a
unanimous jury verdict. 4
Third, the California Supreme Court characterized the statutory jury trial
right as fundamental in In re Gary W. ,41 and found no compelling state
interest in denying the protection of that right to a California Youth Author-
33. Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 578, 456 P.2d 645, 653, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77,
85 (1969).
34. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584,597,487 P.2d 1241, 1249,96 Cal. Rptr. 601,609 (1971);
In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 111, 473 P.2d 999, 1005, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255, 261 (1970); Castro v.
State, 2 Cal. 3d 223, 234-36, 466 P.2d 244, 251-53, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20, 27-29 (1970).
35. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584,597,487 P.2d 1241, 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601,609 (1971);
In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 111, 473 P.2d 999, 1005, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255, 261 (1970); Castro v.
State, 2 Cal. 3d 223, 234-36, 466 P.2d 244, 251-53, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20, 27-29 (1970).
36. U.S.CoNsT. amend. VI.
37. CAL. CONsT. art. I, §16.
38. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§3050, 3051, 3108, 5302, 5303, 5350(d), 6318, 6321.
39. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
40. Id. at 149.
41. Id. at 154 (emphasis added).
42. 67 Cal. 2d 929, 434 P.2d 623, 64 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1967).
43. Id. at 932, 434 P.2d at 625, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
44. Id. at 932, 434 P.2d at 625, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 329 (emphasis added).
45. 5 Cal. 3d 296, 486 P.2d 1201, 96 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
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ity ward who had been civilly committed as the result of a non-jury trial. 46
The court found the purpose of the commitment did not change the funda-
mental nature of the right:
The right to jury trial in an action which may lead to involuntary
confinement of the defendant, even if such confinement is for the
purpose of treatment is. . . fundamental.47
From such unambiguous language it would be difficult to contend that the
jury trial right was less than fundamental. Thus, in an equal protection
analysis the strict scrutiny test must be applied,48 and a legislative classifica-
tion denying the right to jury trial to juveniles must serve some compelling
state interest and be necessary to the furtherance of the state's purpose
before the classification may be upheld. Before proceeding with an equal
protection analysis, it will first be necessary to determine whether any of the
jury trial guarantees are applicable to juveniles.
THE SCOPE OF THE JURY TRIAL RIGHT-
DOES IT INCLUDE JUVENILES?
Denial of the fundamental right of jury trial to juveniles has been upheld
on the ground that juries are inconsistent with the philosophy of the juvenile
court.49 Rehabilitation is the central theme of the juvenile court system, and
courts have feared the damaging effects of juries on the confidentiality and
informality of the proceedings. 50 An added, unexpressed concern may have
been fears of an increased administrative burden. 51 These are the state
interests that may be advanced in support of a denial of the jury trial right.
Since the right in question has been established as fundamental, equal
protection analysis calls for an examination of these interests to determine
whether they are compelling, and if so, whether less constitutionally bur-
densome alternative means of advancing them are available. 52 That part of
the equal protection analysis will be postponed temporarily and a more
semantic argument will be dealt with first: whether juveniles can be denied
the jury trial right because juvenile proceedings are non-criminal, since the
constitutional jury trial rights are only applicable in criminal cases.
46. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§1800-1803 empower the Youth Authority to petition the
court of commitment for an order directing the Youth Authority to retain control over a
dangerous ward beyond the date on which his release would otherwise be mandatory. Since
Gary W. was originally committed to the Youth Authority by a juvenile court, it was a juvenile
court, in the absence of a jury, that found him to be dangerous and ordered him to remain
subject to Youth Authority control for an additional two years. The legislature had provided
other persons who were civilly committed with a right to a jury trial, and the court extended the
statutory civil committment jury trial right to cover persons subject to additional confinement
under CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§1800-1803.
47. 5 Cal. 3d at 306, 486 P.2d at 1209, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 9 (emphasis added).
48. See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 597, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 609(1971).
49. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971).
50. Id.
51. Ketcham, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: The Last Word on Juvenile Court Adjudica-
tions? 57 CORNELL L. REV. 561, 567 (1972).
52. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584,597,487 P.2d 1241, 1249,96 Cal. Rptr. 601,609 (1971).
815
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This section will first evaluate the juvenile court proceeding to determine
whether the non-criminal label can validly be applied. Second, a claim by
juveniles to the statutory civil commitment jury trial right will be analyzed.
Last, a historical examination of the scope of the California constitutional
jury trial right will be made in order to determine whether juveniles accused
of a crime come within its purview.
A. The Application of the Constitutional Criminal Jury Trial Right
The sixth amendment jury trial right is, by its terms, limited to criminal
prosecutions. 53 Since the California Constitution has no such limitation on
its face, the right is ostensibly guaranteed "to all." 54 However, the courts
have implied a limitation to criminal cases. 55 Thus, since a jury trial was
meant to be guaranteed only in criminal prosecutions, juveniles have been
denied jury trials on the sole basis that the processes of the juvenile court are
not criminal in character. The characterization of the juvenile court as
noncriminal is questionable, however, and it is contended that the constitu-
tional criminal jury trial right should include juveniles within its scope.
Accepting for the moment the proposition that the right to a jury trial
under both the federal and California constitutions is limited to criminal
actions, the task becomes one of finding realistic support for the idealistic
notion that juvenile court trials are not criminal prosecutions. In fact, the
purposes, the consequences, and the trappings of juvenile court hearings are
closely akin to criminal prosecutions.
In its most recent review of juvenile court procedures, the United States
Supreme Court agreed that the purposes of juvenile hearings are comparable
to the purposes of criminal trials. In Breed v. Jones56 the Court failed to find
a "persuasive distinction'' 57 between California's jurisdictional hearing 58
and a criminal prosecution, "each of which is designed 'to vindicate [the]
very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws,' "59 and held that the
protection against double jeopardy applied to juveniles. 60
It is becoming recognized that the lofty rehabilitative ideals attributed to
the juvenile court reformers are not the social purposes that the juvenile
system serves. Rather, as with adult systems, juvenile systems are con-
cerned with the goals of retribution, condemnation, deterrence, and in-
53. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury ...." U.S. Co NsT. amend. VI.
54. "Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all. .. "CAL. CONST. art.
I, §16.
55. In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 332, 228 P.467, 472 (1924); see People v. Feagley, 14 Cal.
3d 338, 350-51, 535 P.2d 373, 380-81, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509, 516-17 (1975).
56. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
57. Id. at 531.
58. The jurisdictional hearing is the juvenile court counterpart of the criminal trial, in that
a determination is made as to whether the minor has violated the criminal laws. See CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE §§602, 701.
59. 421 U.S. at 531 citing United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971).
60. Id. at 529.
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capacitation. 61 Perhaps at its inception the only purpose of the juvenile
system was to render aid to children in need,62 to rehabilitate them and
transform them into productive members of society, 63 but the purposes the
juvenile system serves today are broader than that, and are closer to the
purposes of adult incarceration.
In 1976 the California Legislature passed AB 3121. 64 The legislation
responds, in part, to what the lawmakers felt was a popular sentiment
against the juvenile offender.65 AB 3121 brings the District Attorney into
the juvenile arena, 66 provides that those alleged to have committed certain
violent crimes should be tried in the adult system (unless they can rebut the
presumption of unfitness),67 extends the period of jurisdiction that the Youth
Authority may exercise over its wards,68 and lowers the standard to be
applied in detention hearings,69 making it more likely that a juvenile will be
detained before trial. Such changes are inconsistent with a benevolent,
paternalistic parens patriae philosophy. 70
The most revealing recent legislative changes were made to Welfare and
Institutions Code Section 502, which sets out the purpose of juvenile court
law. Prior to 1975 the purposes enunciated in this section evidenced an
overriding concern for the minor. In that year the legislature added:
(b) The purpose of this chapter also includes the protection of the
public from the consequences of criminal activity, and to such
purpose probation officers, peace officers, and juvenile courts
shall take into account such protection of the public in their
determinations under this Chapter.71
The "parent-state" further revealed non-parental motives in 1976 when
Section 502 was again amended. 72 A change was made in subdivision (a) to
permit removal of a minor from his home solely in the interests of public
61. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 80 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CHALLENGE].
62. See Mack, supra note 2, at 107.
63. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967).
64. CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1071, at-.
65. Former President Ford has expressed his opinion:
If they are big enough to commit vicious violence against society, they are big enough
to be punished by society. Detention may not help the juvenile, but it will certainly
help his potential victims.
L.A. Times, Sept. 28, 1976, pt. 1, at 5, col. 1; see note 70 infra.
66. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §650, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1071, § 20, at-;
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §655, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1071, §23, at-; CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE §681, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1071, §26, at -.
67. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §707, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1071, §28.5, at .
68. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §607, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1071, §13, at -.
69. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §628, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1071, §15, at -.
70. Highlighting this legislative mood is the fact that during the 1975-76 session only one
bill was introduced which would have improved the treatment available to juvenile offenders.
AB 2385, 1976 Regular Session. Many more were introduced which authorized harsher treat-
ment: SB 234, 1975 Regular Session; SB 1598, 1975 Regular Session; SB 1694, CAL. STATS.
1976, c. 1070, at -; SB 1695, CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1069, at -; AB 3121, CAL. STATS. 1976, c.
1071, at-.
71. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §502, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 819, at 1872.
72. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §502, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1071, §4, at .
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protection, without the regard for the minor's welfare which was formerly
required by Section 502 (a). A further change included the following goals
among the purposes listed in this subdivision: "to protect the public from
criminal conduct by minors; to impose on the minor a sense of responsibility
for his own acts . . . . 73 Thus, the purposes of juvenile law and criminal
law coincide.
Additionally, the consequences of an adverse adjudication in adult and
juvenile courts are comparable. After citing previous Supreme Court cases
for the proposition that a juvenile proceeding was comparable in seriousness
to a felony prosecution because of the deprivation of liberty and the stigma
involved in both, 74 the Breed Court concluded:
Thus, in terms of potential consequences, there is little to distin-
guish an adjudicatory hearing such as was held in this case [a
California Juvenile Court jurisdictional hearing] from a traditional
criminal prosecution. 75
Either the adult or the juvenile court may deprive an accused of liberty for
considerable periods and, even if the purpose of juvenile incarceration is
perceived as treatment, such purpose is not sufficient to distinguish it from
criminal proceedings. 76 Again, AB 3121 emphasizes the criminal nature of
the juvenile system. The new legislation increased the time period during
which the juvenile court may retain jurisdiction over certain "minors" to
age 23,77 and equalized the maximum period of physical confinement
permitted in both the adult and juvenile systems. 78 As the age limits on
juvenile court commitments are raised, and the sentences imposed by both
courts are equalized, the distinction between the two systems becomes
blurred.
A lasting criminal stigma is also associated with juvenile court involve-
ment.79 As Justice Musmanno observed in In re Holmes:80
It is a. . .delusion to say that a Juvenile Court record does not
handicap because it cannot be used against the minor in any court.
In point of fact it will be a witness against him in the court of...
society where the penalties inflicted for deviation from conven-
tional codes can be as ruinous as those imposed in any criminal
court, it will be a sword of Damocles handing over his head in
public life, it will be a weapon to hold him at bay as he seeks a
respectable and honorable employment. 81
The military, the FBI, and civil service agencies consistently construe a
73. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §502, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1071, §4, at -.
74. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530. (1975).
75. Id.
76. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
77. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §607, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1071, §13, at-.
78. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §731, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1071, §30, at-.
79. See text accompanying notes 100-113 infra; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 9.
80. 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954).
81. 379 Pa. 599, 612, 109 A.2d 523, 529 (1954) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
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juvenile court record as a criminal record, state laws to the contrary
notwithstanding.82
Furthermore, when a minor is charged with a crime, many of the trap-
pings of adult criminal proceedings are present. The minor has a right to
compulsory service of process, 83 the payment of witness fees is within the
court's discretion, 84 and the minor is entitled to court-appointed counsel. 85
Since January 1, 1977, the District Attorney acts as prosecutor, 86 and the
rules of evidence as established by the California Evidence Code and
judicial decisions govern the admission or exclusion of evidence in the
juvenile proceeding.17 On appeal, the case is assigned a criminal docket
number, and, as with criminal cases, the minor is opposed by the Attorney
General. Indigent minors have a right to appointed counsel 88 and a free
transcript at the appellate level.8 9
Recently, the California Supreme Court in People v. Feagley90 extended
the state constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict to persons civilly
committed as mentally disordered sex offenders. 91 This right was extended
despite the implied limitation of the jury trial right in the state constitution to
criminal cases. 92 The court relied in part on the procedural similarities
between civil commitment procedures and criminal trials, the fundamental
nature of the jury trial right, and the comparability of the consequences of
civil commitment and criminal incarceration. 93 This same reasoning is
particularly applicable to juvenile commitment proceedings. If the court
could find that the commitment of a mentally disordered sex offender was
sufficiently "criminal" in nature for the constitutional jury trial guarantee to
apply, it should conclude that the procedures whereby a juvenile is commit-
ted for having violated a criminal law also possess sufficient indicia of
criminality.
B. The Statutory Civil Jury Trial Right As Applied in Civil Proceedings
As an alternative to maintaining that juvenile proceedings are criminal
and that the constitutional jury trial rights apply, juveniles could argue that
82. Cashman, Confidentiality of Juvenile Court Proceedings, A Review, 24 Juv. JUST. 30,
36 (1973).
83. CAL. PEN. CODE §1330; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §664.
84. CAL. PEN. CODE §1329, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §664.
85. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §700.
86. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §650, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1071, §20, at-;
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §655, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1071, §23, at-; CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE §681, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1071, §26, at -.
87. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §701, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1071, §27, at-.
88. CAL. CT. RULES, PRETRIAL AND TRIAL RULES §251 (1973).
89. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §800. This right is independent of the parent's financial
status. Dana J. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 836, 841, 484 P.2d 595, 598, 94 Cal. Rptr. 619, 622
(1971).
90. 14 Cal. 3d 338, 535 P.2d 373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975).
91. Id. at 352, 535 P.2d at 381, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
92 See text accompanying note 55 supra.
93. 14 Cal. 3d at 350-52, 535 P.2d at 380-81, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 516-17.
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the juvenile proceedings are indeed civil in nature. If the proceedings are
civil, a statutory jury trial right is the appropriate source of the minor's claim
to jury entitlement. The legislature has created a right to a jury trial in almost
all cases of involuntary commitment that follow an adjudication of status.
The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act94 provides for the involuntary commitment
of persons who, because of mental disorders, are imminently dangerous or
gravely disabled.95 Related legislation encompasses the judicial commit-
ment of mentally disordered sex offenders,96 and still another portion of the
Welfare and Institutions Code deals with the involuntary commitment of
actual or potential narcotics addicts. 97
In each involuntary commitment case the person detained is entitled to a
jury trial; the sole function of the jury is the determination of whether the
detainee is a person described by the applicable statute. 98 That is, the issue
put to the jury is whether that person is gravely disabled, addicted to
narcotics, or a mentally disordered sex offender.
If juvenile hearings are not to be classified as criminal, then they may be
looked on as status determinations. When a minor is accused of criminal
acts, the function of the juvenile court's jurisdictional hearing is to deter-
mine whether the minor is a person described by Welfare and Institutions
Code Section 602:99 "Any person who is under the age of 18 years when he
violates any law . . . . " 0 The issue to be decided, then, is one of status;
whether the juvenile is a person described by Section 602 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code. This is the juvenile court euphemism for guilt. There is no
provision in the Welfare and Institutions Code for the juvenile court to make
a finding of guilt: the court can only determine whether the juvenile is a
person described by the statute. In order to avoid the stigma of criminality,
the law requires the juvenile court phrase its finding in terms which ring
more of status than guilt. The statutory right to a jury trial in cases of status
determination has been recognized as fundamental, and the right has been
extended by the courts to status offenders other than those originally in-
cluded in the legislative scope on the basis of equal protection.' 0'
As mentioned previously, 02 the California Supreme Court has used an
equal protection analysis to extend the statutory right to a jury trial to Youth
Authority wards alleged to be ineligible for discharge because they are
physically dangerous to the public.10 3 Since the statutory right was deemed
94. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§5000-5401.
95. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5008.1.
96. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§6250-6825.
97. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §3050 et seq.
98. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§3050, 3051, 3108, 5302, 5303, 5350(d), 6318, 6321.
99. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§701. See note 58 supra for a description of the jurisdic-
tional hearing.
100. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §602.
101. In re Gary W., 5 Cal. 3d 296, 308, 486 P.2d 1201, 1210, 96 Cal. Rptr. 1, 10 (1971).
102. See notes 45, 46 supra.
103. See notes 45, 46 supra.
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fundamental in In re Gary W. 104 the strict scrutiny test was applied. The
state could produce no compelling interest to support its denial of the jury
trial right to juveniles while granting it to others who were civilly commit-
ted. The court intimated the state would bear the same burden in cases
dealing with similar types of discrimination.
The court again failed to find compelling state reasons for denying status
offenders the fundamental statutory right to a unanimous jury verdict in
People v. Feagley. 07 Feagley was committed as a mentally disordered sex
offender, a status not included in the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. The jury
unanimity required by the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act 10 8 was compared
with the three-fourths jury verdict authorized in the commitment of mentally
disordered sex offenders, and the court found the distinction to be a denial of
equal protection. 109 If juvenile court procedures are civil in nature, and
confinement of a juvenile is for the purpose of treatment, juveniles should
also be able to claim the fundamental statutory right to a jury trial.
In the case of In re Clarence B. ,110 a juvenile argued that the statutory
jury trial right should be extended to juvenile proceedings. The court
rejected the equal protection argument advanced by the juvenile in that case
stating that:
This argument, however, fails to recognize an important distinc-
tion. In involuntary commitment proceedings of adults, the status
of an individual is determined, i.e., whether or not a certain
person is an addict, mentally disordered sex offender, or an immi-
nently dangerous person. Juvenile proceedings are involved with
guilt, i.e., whether or not a minor has violated the law. .... III
What was most interesting about the opinion was the court's failure to apply
the required strict scrutiny test to the reasons advanced by the state in
support of the jury trial denial, and, most noteworthy, the rejection of the
extension of the civil commitment jury trial right because the juvenile
proceedings involve a guilt, not status, determination, and are thus criminal
in nature. In re Daedler and its progeny reject the extension of the constitu-
tional jury trial right because of the civil nature of the proceedings,If 2 while
104. In re Gary W., 5 Cal. 3d 296, 306, 486 P.2d 1201, 1209, 96 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9 (1971).
105. Id. at 308, 486 P.2d at 1209-10, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
106. Id.
107. 14 Cal. 3d 338, 535 P.2d 373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975).
108. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5303.
109. 14 Cal. 3d at 358, 535 P.2d at 386, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 522. The extension of the statutory
jury trial right was one of two alternative grounds on which the Feagley court based its
decision. See text accompanying notes 90-93 supra, for a discussion of the other alternative;
the application of the California constitutional jury trial right.
110. 37 Cal. App. 3d 676, 112 Cal. Rptr. 474 (1974).
111. Id. at 680, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 475-76. The court also noted more traditionally cited state
interests involved in witholding jury trials from juveniles. These arguments, that informality of
the proceedings would be damaged by introduction of an adversarial atmosphere and a strong
tone of criminality, will be discussed infra. See text accompanying notes 137-207 infra.
112. 194 Cal. 320, 332, 228 P. 467, 472 (1924).
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the court in Clarence B. refused to extend the civil commitment right
because the proceedings are criminal. 113 The elimination of such judicial
inconsistency is a proper role for the California Supreme Court.
The United States Supreme Court has laudably eschewed the civil/crimi-
nal distinction in applying the due process, 114 self-incrimination, 115 and
double jeopardy 116 guarantees to juvenile proceedings. It is urged that the
California court do the same in applying the equal protection and jury trial
guarantees. Constitutional rights should not depend on a a simplistic and
inaccurate label. The jury trial right, be it constitutional or statutory, should
extend to juvenile proceedings, be they civil or criminal.
C. The California Constitutional Jury Trial Right Includes Juveniles
Within Its Scope
The United States Constitution clearly limits its provision of a jury trial
right to criminal cases and common law litigants.' In contrast, the lan-
guage of the California Constitution is much more inclusive:
Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all, but in
a civil case three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict." 18
Such language does not on its face imply that the right to a jury trial is
limited to criminal cases, and yet, it has been so interpreted. "19 An implied
limitation and a questionable civil label attached to a juvenile court proce-
dure which came into existence a half-century after the adoption of the
state's constitution are not firm grounds for witholding a constitutional
guarantee. This comment takes issue with the implication of a limitation
which would exclude juveniles, and seeks here to determine the proper
scope of that constitutional guarantee.
The California Supreme Court has indicated that the scope of the jury trial
right is to be determined by a historical examination of the framer's intent.
As the court has stated:
The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the [California] Constitu-
tion is the right as it existed at common law at the time the
Constitution was adopted. . . .It is the right to trial by jury as it
existed at common law which is preserved; and what that right is,
is a purely historical question, a fact which is to be ascertained like
any other social, political, or legal fact. . . . It is necessary,
113. This argument was advanced in Smith, Jury Trials, The Juvenile Court, and the
California Constitution From Specious Acorns Grow Trees of Injustice, 50 L.A. BAR BULL.
142, 147 (1975). There the author referred to this situation as the "Catch 22" of juvenile law.
114. "[Clivil labels and good intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal
due process safeguards in juvenile courts .... In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970).
115. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967).
116. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529 (1975).
117. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
118. CAL. CONsr. art. 1, §16 (emphasis added).
119. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
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therefore, to ascertain what was the rule of the English common
law upon this subject in 1850.120
"The right is guaranteed as it existed at common law at the time the State
Constitution was adopted and may not be abridged by act of the legisla-
ture." 1 21 If juveniles accused of crimes would have been tried to a jury at the
time of the state constitution's adoption, they are entitled to the protection of
a jury trial. In In re Daedler1 22 the court traced the origin of the parens
patriae concept to feudal times where first the inquisitio post mortem, then
the courts of wards and liveries, exercised supervision over minors. The
equity courts assumed jurisdiction over minors in 1660,123 suggesting 124
jury trials were not available at that time since the Chancellor's decisions
were made according to the conscience of the King without the assistance of
a jury. 125
The United States Supreme Court was convinced that history subsequent-
ly took another turn:
At common law, children under seven were considered incapable
of possessing criminal intent. Beyond that age, they were sub-
jected to arrest, trial, and, in theory, to punishment like adult
offenders. In these old days, the state was not deemed to have
authority to accord them fewer procedural rights than adults. 126
In its historical analysis the Court relied on no lesser authority than Julian
Mack, the chief spokesman for the parens patriae concept. As Mack had
stated:
Our common criminal law did not differentiate between the adult
and the minor who had not reached the age of criminal responsibil-
ity . . . .The child was arrested, put into prison, indicted by the
grand jury, tried by a petit jury, under all the forms and tech-
nicalities of our criminal law. ... 127
There is also evidence that the juvenile accused of a crime was tried to a
jury subsequent to the adoption of the constitution. In Ex parte Becknell, 28
a 13-year-old accused of burglary was committed to Whittier State School
on the basis of a grand jury finding. The California Supreme Court held that
the order of commitment was void since: "The boy cannot be imprisoned as
a criminal without a trial by jury." 12 9
120. People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283,286-87,231 P.2d 832, 835 (1951).
121. People v. Collins, 17 Cal. 3d 687, 692,552 P.2d 742,745, 131 Cal. Rptr. 782,785 (1976).
122. 194 Cal. 320, 228 P. 467 (1924).
123. Id. at 324-25, 228 P. at 469.
124. Note that Daedler was not attempting to trace the historical development in order to
ascertain whether juveniles had juries at the time of the adoption of the state constitution.
125. D.DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 31 (1973).
126. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1967).
127. Mack, supra note 2, at 106.
128. 119 Cal. 496, 51 P. 692 (1897).
129. Id. at 498, 51 P. at 693. But see Ex parte Ah Peen, 51 Cal. 280 (1876), in which a
sixteen year old was sent to industrial school without a jury trial, and the California Supreme
Court declined to issue a writ of habeas corpus. It bears noting, however, that Ah Peen is not
pertinent to the discussion at hand, and should be distinguished from Becknell, in that Ah Peen
was not charged with a crime but was abandoned without known parents.
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Criminal trials were held before a jury in the nineteenth century, whether
the accused was an adult or a juvenile. 3 ' With the introduction of the
juvenile court system, however, juveniles lost that protection. The legisla-
ture cannot so easily abrogate a constitutional right. 131 The New Mexico
Supreme Court, in holding that a juvenile charged with violation of a
criminal statute had a constitutional right to a jury trial, relied solely on a
historical line of reasoning:
We see no escape from the conclusion that at the time of the
adoption of our constitution [1911] petitioner could not have been
imprisoned without a trial by jury. This being true, no change in
terminology or procedure may be invoked whereby incarceration
could be accomplished in a manner which involved denial of the
right to jury trial.132
D. Juveniles Should be Included in the Scope of the Jury Trial Right
The argument that juveniles should be denied jury trials because juvenile
hearings are not criminal seems overly technical and weak. In fact the
hearings are very much like a criminal trial; 133 the purposes and conse-
quences of juvenile adjudications are also strikingly similar. 134 The implica-
tion that the California constitutional right does not include juveniles will
not withstand an historical inspection. The civil label is inaccurate and the
constitutional implication is wrong. Juveniles should not be denied a funda-
mental right on the basis of such reasoning.
A relatively unexplored avenue of attack is for the juveniles to concede
the limitation of the constitutional rights to criminal cases, and the civil
nature of the juvenile proceedings, then claim the civil commitment statu-
tory jury trial right. Should the court decide juvenile hearings are criminal,
the constitutional rights may be claimed; 135 if they are civil, the statutory
right is applicable. 36 If both sources are claimed, the court will be forced to
reason consistently. It will be impossible to sidestep the criminal jury trial
claim by applying the civil label without conceding the validity of a claim to
the statutory right to a jury trial in civil commitment proceedings.
THE STATE'S INTERESTS
The semantic argument that the scope of the jury trial right does not
extend to include juveniles within its coverage has been considered. Since
the right denied to juveniles has been established as fundamental, 137 equal
130. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1967); Mack,- supra note 2, at 106.
131. See text accompanying note 121 supra.
132. Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 724, 437 P.2d 716, 723 (1968).
133. See text accompanying notes 53-93 supra.
134. See text accompanying notes 53-93 supra.
135. See text accompanying notes 53-93 supra.
136. See text accompanying notes 94-116 supra.
137. See text accompanying notes 36-48 supra.
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protection calls for the state to bear the burden of establishing that its
interests are compelling. 138 The philosophical and practical grounds that the
state can advance for denial of the right will now be examined.
The rationale that courts have used for denying the right to a jury trial to
juveniles focuses on the impact the jury trial is expected to have on the
juvenile system. It is feared that informality, supposedly essential to the
rehabilitative process, will be destroyed and that the juvenile court will
become adversarial and assume a criminal tone. It is also argued that
exposure to juries will destroy the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings,
resulting in a criminal stigma being cast upon the minor. Very practical fears
of increased administrative burdens and dollar costs may be the unspoken
motivation behind many judicial opinions. These interests will be examined
to determine whether they may be termed compelling, and, if so, whether
alternative means of advancing them may be available. If the state interests
are not compelling, or less burdensome alternatives are available, the denial
of the jury trial right to juveniles is unconstitutional. 139
A. Confidentiality
A mistake made early in life should not brand one permanently. Many
people whose later lives are respectable have experimented with unlawful
conduct during their adolescence, 140 and an indelible stamp of criminality
applied at this early stage could block opportunities in socially acceptable
endeavors. The stigma of criminality attached to a youth could become a
self-fulfilling prophecy.
The elimination of a criminal stigma was central to the concept of the
social reformers who instituted the juvenile court system. 141 Confidentiality
was to be preserved in the private atmosphere which supposedly surrounded
the juvenile court, and in the secrecy of the court's records. 142
Courts have been protective of the confidentiality of the juvenile system.
They have relied, in part, on the adverse effects they feared juries would
have on this characteristic in denying the right to a jury trial, 143 and utilized
the impact on confidentiality as a critical factor in balancing the desirability
of an advisory jury. 144
It must now be determined whether the state's interest in confidentiality is
compelling and whether less burdensome methods of protecting that interest
exist. This comment does not advocate abandoning the preservation of
138. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584,597,487 P.2d 1241, 1249,96 Cal. Rptr. 601,609 (1971).
139. Id.
140. See Simpson, supra note 3, at 1004.
141. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547, 548 (1957).
142. Mack, supra note 2, at 109.
143. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971); In re Clarence B., 37 Cal. App.
3d 676, 681, 112 Cal. Rptr. 474, 476 (1974).
144. People v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 271, 285, 539 P.2d 807, 816, 124 Cal. Rptr. 47,56
(1975).
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confidentiality as a goal, but seeks to weigh the state's interest in preserving
confidentiality against the juvenile's claim to a fundamental right. The
degree to which confidentiality and avoidance of stigmatization is preserved
in the current operation of the juvenile system is pertinent to an evaluation of
the state's interest in protecting these characteristics from further encroach-
ment. If the present efforts at confidentiality are weak and ineffectual, then
perhaps the state cannot maintain that its interest is so great that it may be
termed compelling. If the state has not plugged leaks in the secrecy of the
present system, then the claim that it has a compelling interest in this facet
of the juvenile system is bloated. If a criminal stigma inevitably results from
a juvenile proceeding, despite the best efforts of the state, then those efforts
are in reality meaningless. The effort may be laudable, but if it is doomed to
failure then the interest promoted is not compelling.
As with so many of the idealistic hopes of the architects of the juvenile
court system, the promises of confidentiality have not been kept. Although
efforts are made to keep court records confidential, 1,5 some social elements
have a genuine need to know the information contained in those records in
order to protect themselves and to function properly. Others inevitably learn
of the minor's brush with the law and will not forget.
Employers, for instance, have an obvious need to know the character of
those in whom they place their trust. It is not surprising to learn that the
pressures employers may be expected to exert on those who can facilitate
efforts to learn the character of prospective employees have sometimes been
fruitful. 146 Similarly, the FBI and the military have genuine needs for
character information, and are in an even better position than potential
employers to exert the required pressure. 147 Recognition of such legitimate
needs may lead one to inquire whether confidentiality is really so socially
desirable.
Occasionally, the juvenile himself is forced to reveal his past. The
military enlistment forms which require the applicant to consent to a full
investigation are sometimes interpreted by the court as consent to disclosure
of juvenile court records. 148 Threats of court-martial and dishonorable dis-
charge for false responses are often sufficient to compel disclosure from the
recruit. The standard employment application form providing for immediate
discharge for the provision of false information also effectively short-
circuits the juvenile court's efforts at keeping records confidential.
California's efforts at preserving confidentiality go one step further than
those of most states in providing that a juvenile may, under certain condi-
145. CAL. PEN. CODE §851.7; CAL. PEN. CODE §1203.45: CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §781.
146. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24 (1967).
147. Id.
148. Sussman, The Confidentiality of Juvenile Court Proceedings: A Review, 24 Juv. JusT,
30, 35 (Aug. 1973).
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tions, have his juvenile record expunged. 149 But an extra step is also
required on the juvenile's part, and that step is not always taken. 150 The
procedure may be complicated and require the assistance of an attorney, but
even simple proceedings are often not followed since the initiative of the
party concerned is required, and that may be lacking. 151
The efforts of the courts to protect the youth from a criminal stigma really
only attacks part of the problem. Contacts with the juvenile court result in a
stigmatization which seems impossible to avoid. The youth's neighbors,
friends and relatives inevitably know of the adjudication, and may have a
closer knowledge of the fact situation involved than the court. These are the
people with whom the juvenile has the most contact, and it is in this
community that the stigma will cost him most dearly.152 The police know
too, and this knowledge is translated into heightened surveillance of the
youth, 153 resulting in a higher likelihood of his re-involvement with the
authorities. 154
A juvenile who appeals an adverse juvenile court decision may risk the
limited protection the secrecy of the court records provides him, in that the
use of the juvenile's name in a published decision is wholly within the
discretion of the appellate court judge. 155 If the court records are kept
confidential, but an identifying appellate decision is publicized, the purpose
of the secrecy is thwarted.
In light of the ineffectiveness of these attempts to preserve confidentiality
and avoid stigmatization, it is unlikely a court would classify the state
interest as compelling. The United States Supreme Court has recognized the
weakness of the confidentiality argument: "This claim of secrecy, however,
is more rhetoric than reality." 156
The interest in confidentiality is really an interest of the minor which the
state in its parens patriae role is asserting on his behalf in order to deny the
juvenile a constitutional right. It is the minor, not the state, who risks the
feared stigmatization. It may be argued that a properly informed and coun-
seled minor should be able to waive his interest in confidentiality if a jury
trial would serve his interests better. 157
149. CAL. PEN. CODE §851.7; CAL. PEN. CODE §1203.45; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §781.
150. A recent study revealed that only a small percentage of juveniles from disadvantaged
areas actually qualify to have their records sealed either because they were unaware of this
possibility or were blocked by the complexity and rigidity of the existing law. STAFF STUDY BY
SENATE DEMocRATIc CAUCUS, THE KEY THAT LOCKS THE RECORDS OPENS THE DOOR, GUIDE TO
SEALING JUVENILE COURT RECORDS 1 (1973).
151. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 93.
152. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 92-93.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Telephone conversation with Robert E. Formichi, Reporter of Decisions, Supreme
Court of California, San Francisco, Calif., Jan. 10, 1977.
156. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24 (1967).
157. A waiver power is already held by the minor. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §676 allows
the minor to request that members of the public be admitted to his hearing. A noted juvenile law
authority, Professor Monrad G. Paulsen supports the view that a properly advised child should
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The weakness of this state interest in confidentiality is coupled with tie
availability of a simple alternative. Jurors may be sworn to secrecy, and the
true name of the juvenile need not be revealed to them. The contempt
sanction will serve to limit the adverse effect on confidentiality.
Confidentiality of juvenile court hearings is a noble goal. But the efforts
at preservation of confidentiality fall far short of the goal. Military and
civilian employers, the youth's neighbors and friends, and the police all
have access to information sources which result in an effective stigmatiza-
tion of the child. Still, the courtroom proceedings should be kept as confi-
dential as possible. Since the swearing of jurors to secrecy would mean that
a jury trial would have only a minimal impact on the confidentiality of the
proceedings, the claim of confidentiality cannot be termed compelling, and
will not support the witholding of a fundamental right.
B. Informality
Rehabilitation is the central theme of the juvenile court philosophy. 158
The juvenile court system was instituted in reaction to the harsh treatment to
which juveniles, incarcerated with adult criminals in nineteenth century
penal institutions, were subjected. 5 9 Instead of receiving the same punish-
ment meted out to adults, juveniles under the juvenile system would be
"corrected," imbued with work habits, and made into productive, con-
tributing members of society.' 60
The rehabilitative process was not to be postponed until the minor reached
a correctional institution; it was to begin in the courtroom. The child was not
to feel he was being dealt with as a criminal, but that the parent-state was
taking him under its protective wing and guiding his future.' 6 ' In order to
achieve this impact on the child, the normal courtroom atmosphere would
have to be altered. As Julian Mack wrote in 1909:
The child who must be brought into court should, of course, be
made to know that he is face to face with the power of the state,
but he should at the same time, and more emphatically, be made to
feel that he is the object of its care and solicitude. The ordinary
trappings of the court room are out of place in such hearings. The
judge on a bench, looking down upon the boy standing at the bar,
can never evoke a proper sympathetic spirit. Seated at a desk,
with the child at his side, where he can on occasion put his arm
around his shoulder and draw the lad to him, the judge, while
be able to waive the confidentiality of the hearing if a public trial is desired. Paulsen, Kent v.
United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 167, 186. For
further discussion, see note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts and Individualized
Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775, 794 (1966).
158. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967).
159. Id. at 15.
160. Id. at 15-16.
161. Id. at 15.
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losing none of his judicial dignity, will gain immensely in the
effectiveness of his work.162
But the price exacted for this idealized courtroom atmosphere was to be
high. The procedural protections guaranteed to adults would bring too much
formality into the juvenile courtroom. Initially, neither the prosecuting
attorney nor the minor's legal counsel was allowed into the juvenile court. 163
The child was not to have the fifth amendment protection against self-
incrimination, since confession was deemed to be good for the child, and
would aid in planning individualized treatment. 164 Confrontation and cross-
examination of witnesses were not permitted. 165 Formal rules would be
dispensed with in the interests of flexibility and informality. 166 A full-blown
jury trial, of course, would destroy this informal atmosphere, increase the
criminal tone of the proceedings, and place the child's fate in the outcome of
the adversarial circus it was so important to avoid. 167 The reformers obvi-
ously had high hopes as to the amount of rehabilitation which could be
accomplished in the courtroom. Nearly all of the constitutional safeguards
which juveniles enjoyed when they were handled by the adult criminal
system were sacrificed to achieve this air of informality.
The notion that the informality of juvenile proceedings is vital to the
rehabilitative process is still very much alive today. It was basic to the
United States Supreme Court's denial of the jury trial right in McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania. 168 California cases reason similarly. In In re Dennis M. ,169 a
Pennsylvania case 170 was cited with approval by the California court for the
proposition that a jury trial would seriously limit the juvenile court's ability
to function in a flexible and unique manner. 7 ' Although a jury trial was not
at issue in Dennis M., appellate courts have relied on the California
Supreme Court's implication therein, that juries are not constitutionally
required, to deny juveniles this right. 172 The courts reason that juries would
add a strong tone of criminality to the proceedings, make it fully adversary,
and overly formal.
These opinions make only perfunctory references to the impact of juries
on formality. No court has examined the juvenile court to depict the
162. Mack, supra note 2, at 120.
163. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 10 (1967).
164. Id. at 50-51.
165. Simpson, supra note 3, at 987.
166. Note, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: A Retreat in Juvenile Justice, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV.
650, 657-59 (1972).
167. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971); In re Clarence B., 37 Cal. App.
3d 676, 679, 112 Cal. Rptr. 474, 475 (1974); In re Steven C., 9 Cal. App. 3d 255, 261, 88 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 99 (1970); In re T.R.S., I Cal. App. 3d 178, 182, 81 Cal. Rptr. 574, 576 (1969).
168. 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
169. 70 Cal. 2d 444, 450 P.2d 296, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969).
170. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super. 62, 234 A.2d 9 (1967).
171. 70 Cal. 2d at 455-56, 450 P.2d at 302, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 7-8.
172. In re Clarence B., 37 Cal. App. 3d 676, 679, 112 Cal. Rptr. 474, 475 (1974); In re
Steven C., 9 Cal. App. 3d 255, 261, 88 Cal. Rptr. 97,99 (1970); In re T.R.S., I Cal. App. 3d 178,
182, 81 Cal. Rptr. 574, 576 (1969).
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protected informal atmosphere. It would seem this much must be done
before the state's interest in preserving it may be termed compelling, and
this will now be attempted.
Even if the juvenile court was once an informal, friendly place, the
changes since 1966 have had a severe impact on that characteristic. The
United States Supreme Court cases alone have caused a serious erosion of
informality. The requirement of a transfer hearing in Kent v. United
States,'73 the requirement that the transfer hearing be held before a jurisdic-
tional hearing in Breed v. Jones,174 and the requirements of In re Gault:175 a
mandate of notice to the juvenile; extension of the self-incrimination right;
and most particularly, the rights to counsel and to confront and cross-
examine witnesses, have altered the flexibility and informality of the pro-
ceedings and added an adversarial tone.
From the youth's viewpoint, the proceedings appear both formal and fast;
it is only the court officials who perceive them as being informal. 176 The
proceedings in juvenile court are often arbitrary and summary. Hearings in
Los Angeles in a year surveyed, for example, lasted only three minutes on
the average. 177 It is difficult to comprehend how three minutes of informal-
ity will do much to rehabilitate an errant youth.
California has altered the juvenile court atmosphere to an even greater
extent than required by the Supreme Court. As a result of recent legislative
changes, the California juvenile court has lost the last vestiges of informal-
ity.178 Welfare and Institutions Code Section 680 provides that except where
there are contested issues of law or fact, the juvenile proceedings shall be in
an informal, nonadversary atmosphere. 179 The existence of formalized rules
would appear to work against the maintenance of flexibility and informality.
However, in November 1976 the Judicial Council adopted a new set of
juvenile court rules. 180 In addition to other changes, procedures were set out
for granting immunity to witnesses, 181 for handling prehearing motions,182
for establishing a factual basis for accepting admissions,183 and the existing
procedures for supplemental petitions and modifications were more clearly
173. 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
174. 421 U.S. 519, 537-38 (1975).
175. 387 U.S. 1, 26-57 (1967).
176. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 10.
177. Id. at 94.
178. See text accompanying notes 179-195 infra.
179. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §680. The California Supreme Court has interpreted the
legislative intent in adding the language "except where there is a contested issue of fact or
law," to this statute as indicating a desire to tip the balance in the direction of the minor's due
process rights and away from informality of procedure in contested cases. People v. Superior
Court (Carl W.), 15 Cal. 3d 271, 279, 539 P.2d 807, 812, 124 Cal. Rptr. 47, 52 (1975). This is
arguably a recognition that, in contested cases, informality is not a compelling interest.
180. Sacramento Press Journal, Nov. 22, 1976, at 1, col.4.
181. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., PROPOSED JUVENILE COURT RULES, Rule 1342 (tent. adopt.
1976).
182. Id., Rules 1341 and 1354(b).
183. Id., Rules 1354 and 1364(d).
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defined and established. I I While the recognition by the Judicial Council of
the need for uniformity and established procedure in the juvenile system is
laudable, the written rules will inevitably impair the informality of the
hearing.
The rules governing the admission and exclusion of evidence in juvenile
court are also becoming more formalized. Before January 1, 1977, the only
limitations placed on the admission of evidence in a juvenile court jurisdic-
tional hearing were that the evidence be relevant.185 AB 3121186 changed
that too. Previously the juvenile court judge was permitted to admit all
relevant evidence, but a finding had to be based on evidence which would
have been admissible in a criminal trial. 187 Now the rules of evidence, as
determined by the Evidence Code and judicial decision, apply in full to the
admission of evidence in a juvenile court. 188 The substantive impact of such
a change may be meaningless since in the absence of a jury trial the judge is
the sole trier of fact and he has probably been exposed to the evidence in
ruling on its admissibility, but its collateral impact on the formality of the
proceedings is apparent.
The most dramatic impact of recent legislation on the nature of the
proceedings is the result of those provisions of AB 3121189 which require the
increased participation of the prosecuting attorney in juvenile court proceed-
ings. Formerly, petitions alleging that the youth had committed a criminal
act and, thus, was a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code
Section 602 were initiated by a probation officer190 whose decision not to
prosecute was reviewable by the juvenile court. 191 With the enactment of
AB 3121,192 the ultimate decision to file a petition and prosecute is in the
hands of the prosecuting attorney, and his discretion is not reviewable. 193
An even greater impact was made by the change which mandates that the
prosecuting attorney represent the state in all proceedings under Welfare and
Institutions Code Section 602. In the past, the law only permitted the district
attorney to assist the probation officer in ascertaining and presenting the
evidence, and then only with the consent or at the request of the juvenile
court judge. 194 The new rule eliminates the probation officer from the
proceedings and provides that in all hearings held pursuant to Section 602,
the prosecuting attorney shall appear on behalf of the people of the State of
California. 195
184. Id., Rules 1391-1393.
185. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §701 (amended 1976).
186. CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1071, at -.
187. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §701 (amended 1976).
188. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §701, as amended CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1071, §27, at-.
189. CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1071, at-.
190. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §650 (amended 1976).
191. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §655 (amended 1976).
192. CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1071, at .
193. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §650, as amended CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1071, §20, at-;
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §655, as amended CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1971, §23. at -.
194. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §681 (amended 1976).
195. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §681, as amended CAL. STARS. 1976, c. 1071, §26, at-.
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With the child represented by one attorney, and the state represented by
another, no valid claim can be made that the proceedings are non-
adversarial. The impact of this change will certainly eliminate the last
vestiges of informality from the juvenile court. One envisions both advo-
cates arguing over some evidentiary rule while Julian Mack's idealized
judge sits with his arm around the youthful felon's shoulder.
The recent legislative changes, together with those already instituted by
the Supreme Court, are at odds with the concept of informality. There is
little, save the presence of a jury, which would differentiate a criminal
proceeding from a juvenile court hearing. What remains to be determined is
whether the state can successfully characterize its interest in the remnants of
informality as compelling.
The first step in that determination is to question the value of the informal
atmosphere. Since an informal courtroom is only a part of an entire program
of rehabilitation, the value of that informality must be measured in the light
of the experiences and successes of the state's rehabilitative efforts. There is
ample evidence that the entire program of rehabilitation has been fruit-
less.' 96 The rehabilitative efforts certainly have not achieved the successes
the reformers originally envisioned. Courtroom informality is only a small
part of a rehabilitation program that appears not to be working.
The value of informality as a rehabilitative tool is also open to question.
There is a considerable body of opinion that informality is not as therapeutic
as originally assumed. 197 To the child and his parents, an informal court
appears to be a confused and bewildering place with unpredictable opera-
tions. 198 The impact of informality on the youth may be precisely opposite to
that intended: distrust may result from what appears to the youth to be an
arbitrary proceeding. 199
The formality that has been so cautiously avoided in juvenile proceedings
may, in fact, be more therapeutic and rehabilitative than the traumatizing
effects of an informal adjudicatory hearing at which the accused is deprived
of basic rights. 20 Juveniles today are sufficiently informed so as to be aware
196. In Gault, the Court relied on a study which revealed that the recidivism rate in the
District of Columbia was over 60 percent. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 (1967). Pearl West,
Director California Youth Authority, in a lecture at University of the Pacific, McGeorge School
of Law, Sacramento, California, on Oct. 26, 1976 estimated the recidivism rate of Youth
Authority wards to be between 44.2 percent and 44.7 percent. Such statistics may, of course, be
misleading. Since there is no control group, one cannot judge how the recidivism rate would be
affected if all efforts at rehabilitation were abandoned.
197. Handler, supra note 4, at 19; Paulsen, Juvenile Courts, Family Courts and the Poor
Man, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 694, 695 (1966), citing Studt, The Client's Image of the Juvenile Court,
in JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 200 (Rosenheim ed. 1962); Note, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: A
Retreat in Juvenile Justice, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 650, 689 (1972) wherein numerous authorities
are cited.
198. Paulsen, Juvenile Courts, Family Courts and the Poor Man, 54 CALIF. L.REV. 694, 695
(1966), citing Studt, The Client's Image of the Juvenile Court, in JusncE FOR THE CHILD 200
(Rosenheim ed. 1962).
199. Handler, supra note 4, at 19.
200. Note, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: A Retreat in Juvenile Justice, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV.
650, 689 (1972) wherein numerous authorities are cited.
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of those rights. 20 1
It seems plausible that a child who expects a formal hearing when charged
with violating a criminal statute is more likely to gain respect for the legal
system if those expectations are met.2 ' 2 Denying the juvenile procedural
rights in the name of informality and rehabilitation serves only to encourage
his cynicism.
Juvenile hearings are divided into two phases. At the jurisdictional phase
the court makes a determination as to whether the minor has violated the
criminal law as alleged. 203 The dispositional phase follows. This phase is
concerned with what should be the proper treatment for the youth. 2°4 The
jury need only be present at the jurisdictional, or guilt- determining phase; if
so, the impact of a jury trial on the court's rehabilitative efforts would be
lessened. The all-important dispositional phase would remain unaffected.
The judge would have all the flexibility required to fashion a disposition
suitable to the needs of the youth. The Court in Gault20 5 regarded both the
dispositional and pre-trial phases as flexible and adaptive to the special
needs of the juvenile, and carefully limited its procedureal requirements to
the jurisdictional phase of the hearing. 2° The jury's role could be similarly
limited.
The jury's presence will concededly alter the courtroom atmosphere. In
evaluating the impact of that alteration, one must remember that the juvenile
court has been evolving. Legislative and judicial changes have created an
already highly formalized, highly adversarial juvenile court. 207 Lawyers
now represent both the state and the youth, and formalized rules must be
followed. The theory that informality has rehabilitative effects is question-
able, and, even if the premise is accepted, such significant changes have
already occurred in the juvenile court system that informality is no longer to
be attained. With such considerations, the state interest in preserving the
informality remaining cannot be termed compelling.
C. Administrative Burden
The final state interest served by denial of jury trials, fears of increased
201. Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966
Supp. CT. REV. 167, 186. It is interesting to note that in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. at
546, the Court relied on the TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 38, which quoted a 1957
article by Professor Paulsen. At that time Paulsen was opposed to jury trials because of the
formality expected to Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547, 559
(1957). But, as the California Supreme Court observed in People v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d
271,282 n. 15, 539 P.2d 807, 815 n. 15, 124 Cal. Rptr. 47, 55 n.15 (1975), Paulsen has altered his
oft-quoted views.
202. See generally Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile
Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 167, 186; Note, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: A Retreat in Juvenile
Justice, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 651, 689 (1972).
203. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §701.
204. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §702.
205. 387 U.S. 1.
206. Id. at 13.
207. See text accompanying notes 173-195 supra.
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administrative burdens, is a very practical consideration. It is feared that the
cost of juries will be prohibitive and that empaneling a jury will cause delay.
Many juvenile courts are overcrowded and understaffed. 208 The courts
operate on a limited budget and fear any new program that will increase
expenses. Additionally, many juvenile hearings are summary proceedings
as a result of heavy caseload pressures. 2°9
Fears of increased expense and a greater backlog of cases may be the
unexpressed rationale behind the denial of jury trials to juveniles. The
plurality opinion in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania21 alluded to such pos-
sibilities,211 but the dissent dealt with the argument more fully, and refuted it
by citing the experiences of courts in Denver and Michigan. The Denver and
Michigan juvenile courts allowed juries,212 but suffered no great administra-
tive burden as a result. 213
The administrative burden argument has never surfaced in a California
case. This is perhaps a testimony to the inappropriateness of such considera-
tions when a constitutional right is at stake. Nevertheless, the potential fears
of cost and delay must be allayed.
Eleven states provide a jury trial by statute; 214 four more require juries as
the result of a judicial ruling. 215 From the experiences of these jurisdictions,
the extent of any increased burden may be estimated. These states have not
been overburdened as a result of allowing juveniles a jury trial option.216
208. Note, The Supreme Court 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REv. 38, 118 (1971), citing
CHALLENGE, supra note 61, at 80.
209. Note, The Supreme Court 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 38, 118 (1971), citing TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 94.
210. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
211. 403 U.S. at 550.
212. Id. at 565.
213. Id.
214. COLO. REV. STAT. §19-1-106 (1973); IND. STAT. ANN. §31-5-2-1 (Burns 1973); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS §712A.17 (1970); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §10-1220 (1974); NEW MEXICO STAT.
ANN. §13-14-28 (Supp. 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 10 §1110 (West Supp. 1974-75); S.D.COMPILED
LAWS ANN. §26-8-31 (1976); TEXAS CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1(13)(b) (Vernon 1971); W. VA.
CODE §49-5-6 (1966); Wyo. STAT §14-115.24 (Supp. 1975).
215. John Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971) and, R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska
1971); State ex rel. Shaw v. Breon, 244 Iowa 49, 55 N.W.2d 565 (1952); State v. Jackson, 503
S.W.2d 185 (Tenn. 1973); Arwood v. State, 62 Tenn. App. 453, 463 S.W. 2d 943 (1970); see Ex
parte State ex reL Simpson, 288 Ala. 535, 263 So.2d 137 (1972) (advisory jury only).
216. In 1970, in anticipation of the Supreme Court's decision in McKeiver, the National
Juvenile Law Center surveyed forty-four courts in eleven jurisdictions which authorized jury
trials. Eleven of the forty-four had never had a jury trial, and of the remaining courts, only five
had more than five jury trials in the preceeding two years. In the jurisdiction having the greatest
experience with jury trials, the District of Columbia, the number of jury trials had never
exceeded 2 percent of the total number of cases heard. The chief reason so few juries are
required is that in most cases the juvenile confesses, or there are no real factual issues in
dispute.
All courts surveyed which had actually conducted a jury trial agreed that juries created no
backlog on the juvenile court docket. Also, the jury trial did not generally result in longer
periods of pre-trial detention, so that the impact of a delay on rehabilitation was minimal.
Other surveys have produced similar results. The one exception appears to be the experi-
ences of the District of Columbia. Congress repealed the juvenile's right to jury trial in the
District of Columbia in order to alleviate the backlog which had developed. This action is
contradicted by the specific finding in the above mentioned survey as to the number of jury
trials actually conducted there and suggests that other factors might have been responsible for
the delays. Burch & Knaupp, The Impact of Jury Trial Upon the Administration of Juvenile
Justice, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 345 (1970).
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The available data suggest that the impact of granting jury trials to
juveniles upon court administration would not be great. Still, some increase
in cost may be expected, and some backlog may result. The Supreme Court
has suggested, however, that considerations of cost and delay are inappro-
priate when dealing with constitutional rights:
The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protec-
tions against arbitrary government are inoperative when they be-
come inconvenient or when expediency dictates otherwise is a
very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish would destroy
the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis of
our Government. 217
The unexpressed fears of increased administrative burdens remain unsub-
stantiated. It is unlikely that great expense or delay will result, and to the
degree that the jury will burden the system, the price cannot be said to be too
high for a fundamental right. The state interest in economy and efficiency is
likewise not compelling.
D. The State has no Compelling Interest in Denying Jury Trials to
Juveniles
The interests the state may be expected to advance in support of the denial
of the fundamental jury trial right to juveniles have been examined. The
interest in confidentiality is a valid concern, but a criminal stigma results
from a juvenile adjudication despite the state's efforts to prevent it, and the
negative impact of juries on confidentiality can be easily minimized by
swearing jurors to secrecy. Informality is perhaps not such a valid goal.
Informal hearings may convey to the youth the idea that the state thinks his
fate is unimportant, and work counter to rehabilitative efforts. Even if we
accept the goal of informality as valid, it seems incapable of achievement in
light of the legislative and judicial changes which have taken place. The
extra cost and delay incurred is an inappropriate consideration when con-
stitutional rights are involved, and, judging from the experiences of sister
states, is unlikely to be of great impact.
The classification of offenders on the basis of age may make sense for the
purpose of determining the treatment they should be afforded (rehabilitation
or punishment). However, age classification, used as the basis for denial of
the jury trial right, is not supported by compelling reasons when the purpose
of the hearing is the determination of whether or not the accused committed
a crime. The classification will not withstand the strict scrutiny required by
an equal protection analysis.
BENEFITS OF A JURY TRIAL
Juries bring an element of the community into the courtroom. It is this
217. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957).
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public participation in the judicial process that may be expected to temper
the legal mind with a healthy dosage of common sense and human emo-
tion.218 Trial by jury is less likely to involve rigid legalistic determinations,
and more likely to reflect current social mores. 219 Juries are less apt to
enforce harsh and unjust laws. They will make findings of fact that will
achieve a just result and disregard an outdated legal concept sooner than
would a judge.
While these benefits are substantial, they are in reality, merely collateral.
The concept of a jury trial was not the work of some social theoretician, it
was born from distrust and fear. 220 After tracing the history of the jury trial,
the United States Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisiana221 explained the
underlying rationale:
The guarantee of jury trial in the Federal and state Constitutions
reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be
enforced and justice administered. A right to jury trial is granted
to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the
Government. Those who wrote our constitutions knew from his-
tory and experience that it was necessary to protect against un-
founded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against
judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority. The fram-
ers of the constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary
but insisted upon further protection against arbitrary action. Pro-
viding an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers
gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzeal-
ous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge. If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgement of
a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of
the single judge, he was to have it. Beyond this, the jury trial
provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a funda-
mental decision about the exercise of official power-a reluctance
to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to
one judge or to a group of judges. 222
Initially it was felt that juveniles were unlikely to be the victims of the
type of judicial abuses which the jury system was designed to correct.2 23 The
reformers' image of the juvenile court judge was of a paternalistic figure
whose interests centered at all times on what was best for the errant youth.224
The ideal judge was part social worker, part philanthropist, part lawyer, and
wholly devoted to helping children. 225 It was thought unlikely that political
218. Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664 (1873).
219. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
220. Id. at 155-156.
221. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
222. Id. at 155-156.
223. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547, 559 (1952).
224. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1967).
225. Mack, supra note 2, at 119.
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pressures would be brought to bear against the accused juvenile, and, if they
should, it was believed that such a judge would not be susceptible.
History tells a different story. Juvenile court judges, like their adult court
counterparts, are not immune from political influence.226 The McKeiver
Court recognized that the superhuman judges originally envisioned have not
evolved: "Too often the juvenile court judge falls far short of that stalwart,
protective and communicating figure the system envisaged." 22 7 The special
experience necessary to understanding the social and psychological factors
involved is often lacking in politically appointed judges. 228 Indeed, some-
times even legal training is absent. In California it is possible the minor's
case will be handled by a referee rather than a judge. The referee's qualifica-
tions may be considerably lower than those required of a judge. 229
History has shown that juvenile courts are susceptible to the political and
discriminatory abuses which the framers of the constitution feared would
corrupt the adult criminal system. 230 The judicial officers who preside over
the juvenile court have at times been incapable of resisting such external
political pressures. 231 They cannot be expected to measure up to the qualifi-
cations originally envisaged, and sometimes lack even the minimal skills
their jobs require. 232 The threat of judicial abuse in the juvenile court is real,
and juries can be expected to buffer that problem. As the Gault233 Court
stated, "unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequent-
ly a poor substitute for principle and procedure."234
The shortcomings of judicial factfinding cannot be cured by resort to the
appellate system. The juvenile court judge alone decides issues of credibil-
ity. No appeal lies from disbelief. Nor can purely arbitrary decisions
ordinarily be overturned. The test on appeal is not "proof beyond a reason-
able doubt," but whether "substantial evidence supports the conclusion of
226. Juveniles who had participated in civil rights demonstrations in the South were
threatened with imprisonment and, as a condition of exoneration or release, were forced to
promise that they would not participate in future civil rights activities. Paulsen, Juvenile Courts,
Family Courts and the Poor Man, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 694, 707-708 (1966), quoting U.S.
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, LAW ENFORCEMENT, A REPORT ON EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE
SOUTH 80-83 (1965). It has also been charged that California courts have become politicized.
Smith, Jury Trials, The Juvenile Court and the California Constitution: From Specious Acorns
Grow Trees of Injustice, 50 L.A.BAR BULL. 142, 148 (1975).
227. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 544 (1971). In a footnote the Court referred
to a study reported in TASK FORCE REPORT supra note 7, at 7, revealing that half the juvenile
court judges lacked undergraduate degrees, a fifth had received no college education at all, and
a fifth were not members of the bar. 403 U.S., at 544 n.4.
228. Paulsen, Juvenile Courts, Family Courts and the Poor Man, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 694,701
(1966).
229. See Gough, Referees in California's Juvenile Courts: A Study in Sub-JudicialAdjudi-
cation, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 3, 6-7 (1967-68).
230. See note 226 supra.
231. Id.
232. See Gough, Referees in California's Juvenile Courts: A Study in Sub-Judicial Adjudi-
cation, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 3, 6-7 (1967-68).
233. 387 U.S. 1.
234. Id. at 18.
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the trier of fact."235 It would seem that only the most blatant abuses will fail
to meet this looser standard.
The jury may give more careful consideration to each case than would a
judge who has seen similar cases countless times before. 236 The jury will
introduce an atmosphere of fairness into the juvenile court and thus may
enhance the youthful offender's rehabilitation. Finally, the very possibility
that a jury may be convened will force judges to give more careful consider-
ation to their cases, since the slightest suspicion of prejudice by either side
will bring an end to jury waivers and an unmanageable workload on the
courts .237
CONCLUSION
A complete equal protection argument, such as that suggested by this
comment, has never been advanced in an attempt to secure jury trials for
juveniles accused of committing a crime. The state has never been forced to
subject its rationale for denying juveniles a jury trial to strict scrutiny. That
scrutiny would be increased if the "ideal" juvenile could be found to attack
the jury trial denial.
The minor in People v. Superior Court,238 Carl W., was a good example
of the type of juvenile possessing characteristics which would best counter
the state's arguments. The court held that the empaneling of an advisory jury
in that case was within the judge's discretion since the benefits to be
expected outweighed the interests in confidentiality and informality. 239 Carl
W. had been the subject of much prehearing publicity in which his name had
been used,24° so his interest in confidentiality was minimal. The charges
against him were of a serious nature (murder), and the factfinding was
expected to be difficult since as many as forty witnesses were expected to be
called and the people's case was based largely on circimstantial evi-
dence. 24 1 In deciding that an advisory jury was within the trial court's
discretion, the court weighed the difficulty of the factfinding task and the
seriousness of the charges against the extent to which the salutary effects of
an informal hearing remained possible. 242
When the California Supreme Court is faced with a minor's demand for a
jury trial as a matter of right, it is to be expected it will find these same
factors relevant. In People v. Superior Court the court declined to consider
235. People v. Reyes, 12 Cal. 3d 486, 497,526 P.2d 225,231, 116 Cal. Rptr. 217,223 (1974);
In re Roderick P., 7 Cal. 3d 801, 500 P.2d 1, 5, 103 Cal. Rptr. 425, 429 (1972).
236. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY, 8 (1966).
237. Smith, Jury Trials, The Juvenile Court and the California Constitution: From Specious
Acorns Grow Trees of Injustice, 50 L.A. BAR BULL, 142, 150 (1975).
238. 15 Cal. 3d 271, 539 P.2d 807, 124 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1975).
239. Id. at 284, 539 P.2d at 816, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 284, 539 P.2d at 815-16, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 55-56.
242. Id. at 284-285, 539 P.2d at 816, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
1977 / Jury Trials for Juveniles
the issue of jury trial by right, stating: "Our function, however, is not to
discuss the law as it may be in the future." 243
The California Supreme Court should be given an opportunity to engage
in that discussion. The jury trial right is fundamental. The high court cannot,
on the one hand, deny the close kinship of juvenile hearings to criminal
trials in order to deny access to the right stemming from the state or federal
constitution, without, on the other hand, conceding the validity of a claim to
the statutory civil committment jury trial right. Alternatively, the court may
choose to recognize that juveniles were meant to be guaranteed the right
under the California Constitution.
The state must bear the burden of proving its interests are compelling.
While the goals of confidentiality and informality are well meant, confiden-
tiality has not been achieved and informality no longer exists. Fears of
administrative burdens are an inappropriate justification, and have not been
substantiated by the experiences of other states. Finally, the jury provides a
valuable protection which is needed in juvenile courts.
The constitutional analysis is complete, the right denied is fundamental,
and no compelling state interests can be advanced in support of its denial.
The invidious classification which denies a fundamental right to juveniles
should fall.
W. J. Keegan
243. Id. at 282, 539 P.2d at 815, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
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